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Abstract
An Experimental Test of a Reward-Cost Formulation 
of Status Inconsistency
James C. Kimberly and Paul V. Crosbie 
Stanford University 
Thibaut and Kelley’s and Homans' conceptualizations of reward- 
cost processes are adapted to the problem of explaining the dissatis­
faction status inconsistency produces. It is shown: (a) that consis­
tency between position and ability ranks is associated with the best 
reward-cost outcome in the case of both high and low ability individuals 
when the rewards attached to holding a position and the rewards attached 
to performing adequately the activities it entails are equal, (b) that 
inconsistency of position and ability is associated with the best 
reward-cost outcome in the case of high ability individuals when 
performance is rewarded more heavily than position, and (c) that 
inconsistency of position and ability is associated with the best 
reward-cost outcome in the case of low ability individuals when 
position is rewarded more heavily than performance. Subjects are led 
to believe that they have high or low ability with regard to a task, 
and rewards for position and performance are varied so as to produce 
the consistencies and inconsistencies described. Arguing from a 
position similar to one advanced by Brehm and Cohen, it is predicted 
that the inconsistencies will not produce lower satisfaction. The 
prediction receives support.
An Experimental Test of a Reward-Cost Formulation 
of Status Inconsistency*
James C. Kimberly and Paul V. Crosbie 
Stanford University
Since Weber (1946) first introduced the idea of multidimensional 
stratification, the process of status equilibration has gained recog­
nition as an area of concern in the study of stratified interaction 
systems. Much of the work on status equilibration has dealt with the 
effects of status inconsistency. It has been suggested that status 
inconsistency leads to personal dissatisfaction, which, in turn, is 
said to result in a number of possible behavioral consequences, 
including tendencies towards revolution (Benoit-Smullyan, 1944), 
political extremism (Lenski, 1954) and psychosomatic stress 
(Jackson, 1962). While it is generally agreed that the dissatisfaction 
associated with status inconsistency is potentially disruptive, there 
exists little consensus as to the exact nature of this dissatisfaction.
In this paper we advance the argument that this dissatisfaction 
is not a result of status inconsistency per se, but, rathe!׳ a result 
of poor reward-cost outcomes often associated with inconsistency.
In order to test a part of our argument, we established some laboratory 
conditions under which a best reward-cost outcome would require in­
consistent behavior, and, then, we attempted to determine whether 
this behavior had any effect upon satisfaction.
Status consistency refers to consistency of ranks on various 
dimensions of status. If an individual^ general status consists of 
his ranks on a number of status dimensions, he will be consistent if
he ranks high on all dimensions or low on all dimensions.
In the present experiment we focused our attention on two dimensions 
of status: position and ability. Position was operationally defined as 
the possession of a task at a given level of difficulty. Ability was 
defined as the capacity to solve a task at a given level of difficulty. 
Status consistency was defined as either high ability and the possession 
of a hard task or low ability and the possession of an easy task, while 
status inconsistency was defined as either high ability and the possession 
of less than a hard task or low ability and the possession of more than an 
easy task.
The contention of this paper that status inconsistency need not
result in dissatisfaction is derived from an application of reward-cost
theory. Kimberly (1966; in press) has shown that Thibaut and Kelley's
(1959) and Homans' (1961) conceptualizations of reward-cost processes
can be adapted so as to explain reactions to inconsistencies of the
ability-position type considered in this paper. The definitions and
assumptions of Kimberly's adaptation can be summarized as follows.
2Rewards are defined as position and performance evaluations, and costs 
are defined as effort. With these definitions in mind, we can present 
the following assumptions: (a) A hard position is more highly evalu­
ated, and thus more rewarding than an easy position, (b) A good 
performance is more highly evaluated, and thus more rewarding than a 
poor performance, and a given level of performance in any position is
evaluated the same as that level of performance in any other position,
3i.e., performance is evaluated relative to position. (c) The effort 
costs of any position are a function of the difficulty of the position
/and the individual's ability. For any given ability, an increase in
the difficulty of the position increases costs, and a decrease in the
difficulty of the position decreases costs. Furthermore, increases in
costs due to increases in position difficulty above the individual's
ability level are weighted heavily whereas decreases in costs due to
decreases in position difficulty below the individual's ability level
4are weighted lightly. (d) An individual will tend to choose for himself 
that position which allows him to realize his best reward-cost outcome.
From these assumptions we can begin to see that by varying the 
importance of either position or performance evaluations, we should 
be able to produce differences in the kinds of position an individual 
will choose. In the present experiment we introduced three types of 
reward structures which should differentially affect the individual's 
choice of position. One of these structures should produce consistent 
choices by both high and low ability individuals; the second should 
produce inconsistent choices by high ability individuals; and the third 
should produce inconsistent choices by low ability individuals. Since 
we used the same kind of tasks in each reward structure, but with dif­
fering emphasis on rewards for position and performance, costs resulting 
from the objective difficulty of positions were considered to be the 
same for all three reward structures. The three reward structures 
and their effects on the individual's choice of position are considered 
in greater detail below.
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In a structure that gives roughly the same emphasis to both 
position and performance rewards (henceforth called a typical struc­
ture), we would expect both high and low ability individuals to choose 
positions that require the amount of ability they have, i.e., we would 
expect them to equilibrate. In the case of a high ability individual, 
choosing anything less than a hard position should decrease both position 
rewards and effort costs. Performance rewards should remain relatively 
constant because he should still perform well. Since he weights effort 
costs lightly, the decrease in position rewards should reduce his 
outcome. In the case of the low ability individual, choosing anything 
more than an easy position should increase both position rewards and 
effort costs. Performance rewards should decrease because he should 
perform less well. Since the decrease in performance rewards tends to 
offset the increase in position rewards, and since he weights effort 
costs heavily, the increase in such costs should reduce his outcome.
We call the above structure "typical" because of the three reward 
structures considered, we feel it to be most representative of our own 
society. Since any inconsistency in this structure would result in 
poor reward-cost outcomes, we can understand why dissatisfaction in our 
society is associated with ability-position inconsistencies. However, 
as we have indicated, we think that such inconsistencies in themselves 
have little effect upon satisfaction.
5In a structure which strongly emphasizes performance rewards and de- 
emphasizes position rewards (henceforth called a performance structure), 
we would expect a high ability individual to choose a position which 
requires less ability than he has, i.e., we would expect him to dis- 
equilibrate. Doing so should decrease both position rewards and effort 
costs. However, position rewards are small in this structure. Further, 
choosing an easier position should increase the certainty of obtaining 
performance rewards which are large in this structure. Thus, when per­
formance rewards are large enough, a high ability individual should 
obtain his best outcome by disequilibrating.
If our reasoning about the behavior in a performance structure is 
correct, then we would expect the opposite behavior in a structure where 
the emphasis is reversed. Thus, in a structure which strongly emphasizes 
position rewards and de-emphasizes performance rewards (henceforth called 
a position structure), we would expect a low ability individual to choose 
a position which requires somewhat more ability than he has, i.e., we 
would expect him to disequilibrate. Doing so should increase both posi­
tion rewards and effort costs. However, position rewards are large in 
this structure. Further, although choosing a harder position should de­
crease performance rewards, these rewards are small in this structure. 
Thus, when position rewards are large enough, a low ability individual 
should obtain his best outcome by disequilibrating.
We can summarize the effects of these reward-cost structures upon 
choice of position in the form of propositions.
1. Under the conditions of a typical structure, both high and 
low ability individuals will tend to choose positions which require 
the amount of ability they possess.
2. Under the conditions of a performance structure, high ability 
individuals will tend to choose positions which require less ability 
than they possess.
3. Under the conditions of a position structure, low ability 
individuals will tend to choose positions which require more ability 
than they possess.
We can now introduce a final assumption upon which our argument 
basically rests. This is that: (e) Status inconsistency will have 
little effect upon the satisfaction of an individual if it is associated 
with his best reward-cost outcome. Our rationale for this assumption 
is similar to a position taken by Brehm and Cohen concerning cognitive 
consistency. These authors suggest that dissonance as a motivating 
force does not occur when the individual does not feel that he is in 
some way responsible for an inconsistency (1962, Chapter 11). Our 
rationale can be stated in similar terms as follows: If an individual 
is motivated to obtain his best reward-cost outcome and if the reward 
structure requires that he choose a position which is inconsistent with 
his ability in order to obtain this outcome, he should not feel responsible 
for the choice and thus should not be dissatisfied with it.
We are now in a position to formulate the propositions which were 
tested in the present experiment.
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4. There will be no differences in satisfaction between high 
ability individuals in a typical structure who have positions which 
require the amount of ability they possess and high ability individuals 
in a performance structure who have positions which require less 
ability than they possess.
5. There will be no differences in satisfaction between low 
ability individuals in a typical structure who have positions which 
require the amount of ability they possess and low ability individuals 
in a position structure who have positions vAiich require more ability 
than they possess.
Experimental Design
General procedure. Two subjects at a time were taken into an 
experimental room. Inside this room there were two booths, a table for 
the experimenter, and a blackboard. Each booth consisted of a table 
and chair and was separated from the other booth by a curtain which 
made it impossible for the subjects to see one another. Since the 
particular ability treatment a subject received depended upon the booth 
he was in, the subjects were randomly assigned to the booths.
Once seated, the subjects were told that they would be given an 
ability test, and, then, would be asked to choose and to work on two 
sets of problems. They were further told that each set of problems 
would be chosen from a list of seven kinds of sets which varied in 
difficulty. Each set consisted of three problems. Individual problems 
were defined for the subjects in terms of three levels of difficulty: 
easy, medium and hard. The seven kinds of sets ranged in difficulty 
from a set with three easy problems to a set with three hard problems 
(see the left-hand column of Table 2 for the complete list).
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Before the subjects began the two problem periods, they were given 
the ability test. This consisted of six problems of the same type 
included in the sets. Two of these problems were labelled easy, two 
medium and two hard. The subjects were told that these particular 
problems were "extremely accurate predictors" of how well they would 
do in the two problem periods. Unknown to them, one subject received 
problems that were objectively easier than those the other subject 
received. The same difference in objective difficulty was maintained 
for the sets in the problem periods as well. This constituted the 
ability manipulation and will be explained in further detail in the 
following section.
The subject who received the objectively easier problems, the high 
ability treatment, was told he got all six problems correct, whereas, 
the subject who received the objectively harder problems, the low ability 
treatment, was told he got only the two easy problems correct.
Following the ability test, a point system was explained to the 
subjects. Unknown to them, there were three reward conditions in the 
experiment; these were designed to approximate the typical, performance 
and position structures described in the previous section. These 
point systems will be described shortly. The subjects were told to 
obtain "as many points as possible." This directive was designed to 
strengthen the choice tendencies described in propositions 1, 2 and 3.
The subjects were also told that they should not be concerned with group 
outcome. This was included to provide for an individual orientation 
toward obtaining rewards.
9As indicated earlier, each problem period consisted of each subject 
choosing and working on a set of problems. The subjects were told prior 
to each problem period that they could choose any kind of set they wanted, 
and that there were enough problems so that both of them could have the 
same kind of set if they both chose the same kind. It was felt that this 
would eliminate any concern they might have about depriving the other 
person and, thus, would make any inconsistent choices easier.
After the problem periods, the subjects were given a satisfaction 
measure. This was followed by the administration of a post-experimental 
questionnaire which was designed to check the effectiveness of the various 
experimental manipulations and controls and to ascertain suspicion.
Tasks and ability manipulation. The seven kinds of sets of 
problems constituted the tasks in the experiment. The individual 
problems used in these sets were taken from Raven’s Standard Progres­
sive Matrices. This is an I.Q. test, but the subjects were told it was 
not so as to eliminate insofar as possible any suspicion which their 
conceptions of their I.Q.’s might produce. The solution to each pro­
blem requires the completion of a series of symbol configurations. The 
series to be completed is preceded by two complete series of similar 
configurations which define a principle of variation.
As indicated earlier, high and low ability conceptions were created 
by giving the subjects problems of differing difficulty. On the basis of 
a pretest with twenty-five students from the same college as the subjects, 
we selected problems from the Progressive Matrices test which fell at 
five different levels of objective difficulty. These levels ranged from 
one, the easiest, through five, the hardest. In order for the ability
manipulation to be credible, the first three levels were selected so 
as to be easy to solve while the last two were selected so as to be 
extremely hard to solve. Since many of the problems in this test can 
be solved by the average college student given an indefinite period 
of time, it was necessary to restrict the time allowed. Fifteen 
seconds per problem was allowed. The mean proportion of problems 
solved correctly at level one was 100%; at level two, 88%; at level 
three, 82%; at level four, 29%; and at level five, 5%.
From Table 1 it can be seen that the high ability conception was
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induced in the ability test by giving a subject problems from levels 
one, two and three, and labelling these easy, medium, and hard respect­
ively. We believed that a subject in this condition would be confident 
that he could solve all of the problems correctly. The low ability 
conception was induced in the ability test by giving a subject problems 
from levels three, four and five, and labelling these easy, medium 
and hard. We believed that a subject in this condition would be 
confident that he could solve only the easy problems correctly. The 
problems in the sets in the problem periods varied in objective 
difficulty in the same way as did the problems used in the ability 
manipulation. For example, as indicated in Table 1, if a subject chose 
a set with three medium problems in it, he would receive three problems 
at level two if he were in the high ability condition, but three 
problems at level four if he were in the low ability condition.
Assigned and Objective Levels of Difficulty
Table 1
Levels assigned Objective Levels assigned
high ability levels low ability
subjects subjects
5 H (hard)
4 M  (medium)
H (hard) 3 E (easy)
M (medium) 2
E (easy) 1
Both in the ability test and in the two problem periods, subjects 
in the high ability condition were always told they got all of their 
problems correct, while subjects in the low ability condition were 
always told they got only their easy problems correct.
Reward conditions. In operationalizing the typical, performance 
and position reward structures, we had no means for measuring the exact 
reward-cost magnitudes involved. Consequently, we had to create gross 
differences between these structures. This was accomplished by awarding 
points for those aspects of each structure which were to be emphasized 
and then directing all subjects to maximize these points. Thus we 
could expect differences in choice behavior between reward conditions, 
but we could not predict exactly which choice would constitute the best 
reward ־•cost outcome in any condition for a given level of ability.
In the typical structure emphasis was given to both position and 
performance rewards. As indicated in Table 2, points in the typical
Insert Table 2 about here
condition were awarded for both the difficulty of the set, position 
rewards, and the number of problems solved correctly, performance 
rewards. An attempt was made to give roughly equal emphasis to both 
components. One point was awarded for each easy problem in a set, two 
points for each medium problem and three points for each hard problem. 
The value of an individual set was equal to the sum of the values of 
the problems in it. Two points were awarded for each problem solved 
correctly, irrespective of difficulty. It was possible to receive six 
points, or the average value of the sets, by solving all three problems
Table 2
Point System fcr Typical Rewerd Condition
Values Totals
Problem
sets
High Low
ability ability 
subjects subjects
Solutions 
low ability 
subjects were 
told were 
correct
Solutions 
high ability 
subjects were 
told were 
correct
Sets
#7 HHH 9 6 0 15 9
#6 MHH 8 6 0 14 8
#5 MMH 7 6 0 13 7
#4 MMM 6 6 0 12 6
#3 MME 5 6 2 11 7
#2 MEE 4 6 4 10 8
#1 EEE 3 6 6 9 9
in a set correctly. However, in examining this system it should be 
remembered that the low ability subjects were told they solved only the 
easy problems correctly while the high ability subjects were told they 
solved all problems correctly. The high ability subjects in this 
condition could receive their maximum points by choosing an HHH set. 
Thus maximization for these subjects was associated with consistency.
A more interesting situation confronted the low ability subjects.
The totals for low ability subjects were symmetrical; these subjects 
could receive their maximum points by choosing either an EEE or an HHH 
set. Thus maximization for these subjects was associated with both 
consistency and extreme inconsistency. Consideration of effort costs 
led us to predict the former.**
In the performance structure, emphasis was given to performance 
rewards. As indicated in Table 3, points in the performance condition
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were awarded only for correct solutions. Five points were awarded for 
each problem solved correctly, irrespective of difficulty. It was 
possible to receive fifteen points by solving all three problems in a 
set correctly. The high ability subjects could receive their maximum 
points by choosing any of the seven sets available. Thus maximization 
for these subjects was associated with consistency as well as with any 
state of inconsistency. Consideration of certainty in obtaining the r. 
maximum led us to predict something easier than the equilibrated HHH 
set. The low ability subjects could receive their maximum points by 
choosing an EEE set. Thus maximization for these subjects was associated 
with consistency.
Table 3
Point System for Performance Reward Condition
Problem
sets
Values Totals
Sets Solutions 
high ability 
subjects were 
told were 
correct
Solutions 
low ability 
subjects were 
told were 
correct
High
ability
subjects
Low
ability
subjects
#7 HHH 0 15 0 15 0
#6 MHH 0 15 0 15 0
#5 MMH 0 15 0 15 0
#4 MMM 0 15 0 15 0
#3 MME 0 15 5 15 5
#2 MEE 0 15 10 15 10
#1 EEE 0 15 15 15 15
In the position structure, emphasis was given to position rewards. 
As indicated in Table 4, points in the position condition were awarded
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only for the difficulty of the set. Three points were awarded for each 
easy problem, six points for each medium problem, and nine points for 
each hard problem. As in the typical condition, the value of any given 
set was equal to the sum of the values of the problems in it. The high 
ability subjects could receive their maximum points by choosing an 
HHH set. Thus maximization for these subjects was associated with 
consistency. The low ability subjects could receive their maximum 
points by also choosing an HHH set. Thus maximization for these 
subjects was associated with extreme inconsistency.
A word should be added on the distribution of points. Those 
points that were awarded for the difficulty of the set, in the typical 
and position conditions, were given immediately after the set was 
chosen and before the set was obtained. These points were given 
independently of performance and would not be lost in the event a 
subject was told he solved a problem incorrectly. Points awarded for 
correct solutions, in the typical and performance conditions, were 
given at the end of each problem period after the problems ostensibly 
has been corrected.
Measures. The two basic manipulations in the experiment were 
the high and low ability conceptions and the point systems. Two 
measures of the effectiveness of the ability manipulation were used. 
Both v/ere contained in the post-experimental questionnaire. One was
Table 4
Point System for Position Reward Condition
Values Totals
Problem
sets
Sets Solutions Solutions High Low
high ability low ability ability ability 
subjects were subjects were subjects subjects
told were told were
correct correct
#7 HHH 27 0 0 27 27
#6 MHH 24 0 0 24 24
#5 MMH 21 0 0 21 21
#4 MMM 18 0 0 18 18
#3 MME 15 0 0 15 15
#2 MEE 12 0 0 12 12
#1 EEE 9 0 0 9 9
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designed to determine how accurate each subject felt the scoring was 
in the ability test. The other was designed to determine who each 
subject felt had the highest ability, himself or the other subject.
A measure concerning each subject's understanding of the point system 
operative in the condition he was in was also included in the post- 
experimental questionnaire.
The measure of a subject's tendency toward or away from status 
consistency was his choice of a problem set in the second problem period. 
Since each subject had had experience with nine problems by this time, 
six in the ability test and three in the first problem period, it was 
felt that his conception of his ability should be stabilized at this 
point.
Satisfaction was measured at the end of the second problem period, 
after the results of that period had been made known. Each subject filled 
out a questionnaire which required him to compare the difficulty of the 
problems in his set in the second problem period and the difficulty of 
the problems he was able to solve correctly on the ability test. He 
was then asked how he felt about this comparison. His feelings were 
indicated on an eleven-point scale which ranged from "felt very 
satisfied" to "felt very dissatisfied."
Subjects. Ninety male students from English classes in a nearby 
junior college were used as subjects. Of this number, thirty were 
assigned to each of the three reward conditions, and, within each 
condition, fifteen were assigned to the high ability treatment and 
fifteen to the low ability treatment, A maximum age of twenty years 
was set so as to insure that most subjects would be relatively naive 
concerning social-psychological experimentation. The subjects were 
recruited on a volunteer basis and were paid an hourly rate for their 
participation.
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Results and Discussion
In reporting the results of the experiment, we will focus on the 
comparisons specified in propositions 4 and 5. Although we will 
present all of the data for high and low ability subjects in all three 
reward conditions, we shall be primarily interested in any differences 
in behavior between high ability subjects in the typical and performance 
conditions and between low ability subjects in the typical and position 
conditions.
Manipulation validation. As mentioned earlier, measures of the 
effectiveness of the ability manipulation were obtained after the 
experiment. One measure involved asking each subject how accurate he 
felt the experimenter was in scoring both his solutions and the other 
person's solutions to the problems in the ability test. Each subject 
responded to questions about self and other by circling a number on a 
six-point scale, ranging from 0 for "completely inaccurate" to 5 for 
"completely accurate." It was felt that these would serve as meaningful 
measures of the effectiveness of ability manipulation because it was 
assumed that the experimenter's instructions would be highly regarded 
in the absence of suspicion. It will be remembered that the 
experimenter told the subjects that their performance on the ability 
test would be an extremely accurate predictor of their performance 
during the problem periods.
Table 5 presents the medians of the high ability subjects'
Insert Table 5 about here
Median Responses of High Ability Subjects 
Concerning Accuracy of Scoring in the Ability Test
Table 5
Reward condition
Typical Performance Position
Own solutions 5.0 5.0 4.0
Other's solutions 5.0a 5.0 4.0
Note.-Number in each cell !o 15 unless otherwise specified
N=14; by error the question was not included in one subject 
questionnaire.
estimates of scoring accuracy in the ability test. A Kruskal-Wallis 
one-way analysis of rank variance was made on the distributions for 
the three reward conditions for both "own solutions*' and "other's 
solutions." The H values (3.26 for "own" and .99 for "other;" 
corrected for ties) are not significant in either case.^ Thus we 
conclude that there were no significant condition effects on the high 
ability subjects' estimates of the accuracy of the experimenter's 
scoring of either their own solutions or the other person's solutions 
in the ability test.
Table 6 presents the medians of the low ability subjects' estimates
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of scoring accuracy in the ability test. Again, the H values (.18 for 
"own" and 1.06 for "other;" corrected for ties) are not significant.
Thus we conclude that there were no significant condition effects on 
tho low aMlxfcy !subjects' estimates of the accuracy of the experimenter's 
scoring of either their own solutions or the other person's solutions 
on the ability test.
A comparison of Table 5 with Table 6 reveals that the high ability 
subjects felt that the experimenter was more accurate in his scoring 
than the low ability subjects. This difference can be at least partially 
explained by the ability treatment. The high ability subjects were 
always told they got all of their problems correct, whereas, the low 
ability subjects were always told they got their medium and hard problems 
wrong. If we assume that an individual is more likely to accept positive
Median Responses of Low Ability Subjects 
Concerning Accuracy of Scoring in the Ability Test
Table 6
Reward condition
Typical Performance Position
Own solutions 4.0 4.0 3.0
Other's solutions 3.oa 4.0 5.0
Note.-Number in each cell is 15 unless otherwise specified. 
&N=14; one subject failed to answer this question.
assessments of his qualities rather than negative ones, we might 
expect this difference.
While this difference between high and low ability estimates 
does exist, the medians of the estimates were in all cases above the 
2.5 mid-point on the 0 to 5 scale, that is, they were on the accurate 
side of the scale. Thus, the subjects in both ability treatments 
appear to have believed that the experimenter was accurate in scoring 
both their own solutions and the other person's solutions in the 
ability test.
The other measure of the effectiveness of the ability manipulation 
involved asking each subject whether or not there was a difference 
between his ability and that of the other person. The question was 
responded to by checking a "yes" or a "no" category. If he checked 
"yes," he was asked to indicate who had the higher ability, he or the 
other person. All but two of the subjects responded to this question 
in '*ays that indicated that the ability treatment they were in was 
effective. Thus the subjects appear to have perceived a difference 
between their own and the other person's ability.
The measure of understanding of the point system mentioned earlier 
involved asking each subject what the number of points received depended 
on. The question was responded to by checking a category indicating 
the difficulty of the set chosen, a category indicating the number of 
problems solved correctly, or a category indicating both the difficulty 
of the set and the number of problems solved correctly. All but five 
of the subjects responded to this question in ways that indicated they 
understood the point system operative in the conditions they were in.
g
The maximum number of subjects in any condition was two.
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The final manipulation to be considered is that of position choice.
To the extent that the ability manipulations and the operationalization
of the reward structures were successful, tendencies toward or away
from status consistency in the different structures should occur in
accordance with propositions 1,2 and 3. The measure of such tendencies
was the subjects’ choices of sets of problems from the seven kinds of
sets available. Only choices from the second problem period were 
9considered. In analyzing these data, values of one through seven 
were assigned to the different sets of problems, one representing the 
easiest kind of set and seven the hardest.
Table 7 presents the medians of the values of the sets chosen by
־18־
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high ability subjects in all three reward conditions. According to 
propositions 1 and 2, high ability individuals will tend to choose 
positions which require the amount of ability they have in a typical 
structure and positions which require less ability than they have in a 
performance structure. The difference between the distributions of 
set choices for high ability subjects in the typical and performance 
conditions was tested by means of the Mann-Whitney U test. The U value 
for the difference between the distributions is highly significant 
(U = 15.5; p <  .001; l־tailed test). Thus, we can say that the high 
ability subjects in the typical and performance conditions behaved as 
expected.
Median Values of Problem Sets Chosen by High Ability Subjects
Table 7
Reward condition
Typical Performance Position
7.0 5.0 7.0
Note.-Number in each cell is 15.
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Table 8 presents the medians of the values of the sets chosen by
Insert Table 8 about here
low ability subjects in all three reward conditions. According to propo­
sitions 1 and 3, low ability individuals will tend to choose positions 
which require the amount of ability they have in a typical structure 
and positions which require more ability than they have in a position 
structure. The difference between the distributions of set choices for 
low ability subjects in the typical and position conditions was also 
tested by means of the U test. The Z for the U value reached .05 (U =
75.5; Z = 1.603; p = .054; l־tailed test).^ Thus, we can say that 
the low ability subjects in the typical and position conditions 
behaved as expected.
Satisfaction. As stated in propositions 4 and 5, differences in 
ability-position consistency which result from attempts to obtain a 
best reward-cost outcome will have little effect upon satisfaction.
These propositions were tested by comparing satisfaction scores for the 
high ability subjects in the typical and performance conditions and the 
low ability subjects in the typical and position conditions.
As mentioned earlier the measure of satisfaction was a question 
which required the subject to indicate the difficulty of the problems 
in his set in the second problem period, the difficulty of the problems 
in the ability test he was able to solve correctly, whether or not the 
problems he had in the second problem period were too hard or too 
easy in terms of how he did on the ability test, and how he felt about this.
The subject responded by circling a number on an eleven-point scale 
*fliich ranged from 5־ for "felt very dissatisfied," to 0 to +5 for "felt 
very satisfied." The complexity of the question derives from the fact 
that it was felt desirable to be as sure as possible that the subject's 
attention was directed to any discrepancy that might exist between his 
perceived ability and the difficulty of his set of problems.
Table 9 presents the medians of satisfaction scores for high ability
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subjects in all three reward conditions. According to proposition 4,
there should be no difference in satisfaction between the high ability
subjects in the typical and performance conditions. The difference
between the distributions of satisfaction scores for high ability subjects
in these two conditions was tested by means of the Mann-Whitney U test.
The U value is not significant (U = 102.5; 2־tailed test). Thus, the
prediction concerning the effect of inconsistency produced by a performance
structure is supported. This finding supports the general thesis that
11status inconsistency itself has little effect upon satisfaction.
Table 10 presents the medians of satisfaction scores for low ability
Insert Table 10 about here
subjects in all three reward conditions. According to proposition 5, 
there should be no difference in satisfaction between the low ability 
subjects in the typical and position conditions. The difference
Median Satisfaction Scores of High Ability Subjects
Table 9
Reward condition
Typical Performance Position
5.0 4.0 4.0
Note.-Number in each cell is 15
Table IO
Median Satisfaction Scores of Low Ability Subjects
Reward conditions
Typical Performance Position
-2.0 -1.0 0 •CO1
Note.-Number in each cell is 15.
־22־
With regard to the generality of the results obtained here, two 
possible extensions of the present research suggest themselves. First, 
it would be desirable to show the effects of inconsistency upon satis­
faction when the inconsistency is not associated with a best reward- 
cost outcome. Second, if the results are to be generalized beyond the 
ability-position inconsistencies studied here, it will be necessary 
to determine the effects on satisfaction of inconsistencies between 
other status components. This would require conceptualizing these 
components in terms of rewards and costs and then testing to see if 
best outcome inconsistencies between them lower satisfaction.
Footnotes
1 This research was supported by NSF grant GS-687 to the first 
author for investigation of status inconsistency in groups and organizations. 
We would like to express our appreciation to Kurt W. Back for reading 
and criticizing the first draft of the paper. We are also indebted to 
Morris Zelditch, Jr. and Bo Anderson for reading and criticizing later 
drafts of the paper and to Eugene Lehr for his assistance in several 
phases of the research. A condensed version of the paper was read in 
the social psychology section of the annual meetings of the Pacific 
Sociological Association in March 1967.
2 This analytic distinction between position and performance 
as alternative sources of evaluation is similar to Davis' distinction
between prestige, as an evaluation "attached solely to the --  office,"
and esteem, as an evaluation attached "to the success or failure in 
carrying out the stipulations" of the office (1948, pp. 93-94).
Contrary to Davis' conceptualization of esteem, however, we 
do not consider performance to be an entirely independent status component, 
even though it is an additional source of evaluation. Assuming a 
constant or randomized motivation, performance reflects the relation 
between position and ability. For example, both high and low ability 
individuals can perform well if they have respectively hard and easy 
positions, but a low ability individual cannot perform well if he has a 
hard position.
־2־
o The second part of this statement is as much an imposed 
condition as it is an assumption. While to some it may seem an 
unrealistic condition, consider the following: We often say that 
two men "both do their jobs well." This is to give both men similar 
performance evaluations. In such instances, it is only when we note 
differences in the men's positions, e.g., that one has a hard position 
and the other an easy position, that overall differences in evaluations 
tend to arise.
^Thibaut and Kelley have reviewed studies which indicate that 
low ability individuals weight costs more heavily than high ability 
individuals (1959, pp. 09-95). This assumption is derived from this 
idea.
5 We do not think that this contradicts what is known concerning 
achievement motivation (McClelland, 1961, Chapters 2 and 9). It 
suggests rather that the motivation to excel may be under certain 
conditions limited by the costliness of failure.
^It should be noted that this structure is directly relevant to 
the assumption presented in the previous section concerning how costs 
are weighted. If individuals do weight costs more heavily when position 
difficulty is above their ability, low ability subjects should make 
consistent choices.
7 P values larger than .05 are reported as not significant 
throughout this paper.
o0 Three of the five subjects were in the performance condition, 
one was in the high ability treatment and two were in the low ability 
treatment. The two other subjects were in the position condition, one 
in the high ability treatment and one in the low ability treatment.
^As indicated earlier, the first problem period was included 
in the experiment because it was believed that the experiment would 
be more powerful if the subjects were permitted one period in which to 
"test" the results of the ability test and to gain experience with the 
point system.
*-®Although Z is normally used only when N2 ^ 20, it was 
employed here because there were several long ties, the U value was 
very close to the value required for significance, and only the formula 
for Z allows for correction of ties.
**It might be argued that the position structure may put even 
greater pressure on the high ability subject to equilibrate than does 
the typical. If this were true, it could be argued that a more powerful 
test of proposition 4 would be to compare the distributions of satisfaction 
scores for high ability subjects in the position and performance conditions. 
This was done and the U value is not significant (U = 112.5; 2-tailed test).
It might be argued that the performance structure may put 
even greater pressure on the low ability subject to equilibrate than 
does the typical. If this were true, it could be argued that a more 
powerful test of proposition 5 would be to compare the distributions of 
satisfaction scores for low ability subjects in the performance and 
position conditions. This was done and the U value is not significant 
(U = 89.5; 2-tailed test).
-4•
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